Parker v. Randolph by Powell, Lewis F., Jr.
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons
Supreme Court Case Files Powell Papers
10-1978
Parker v. Randolph
Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Evidence
Commons
This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Powell Papers at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Parker v. Randolph. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 61. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee
University School of Law, Virginia.
/~ Vl-4!%fi,;"C.e-r~ 
~~~· 
CHIEF HARRY PARKER (warden) 
v. 
RANDOLPH, PICKENS & 
HAMILTON (convicted murderers) 
Federal/Civil~ 
Timely 
sm·U,1ARY: Petitioner seeks revie\v of the affirmance of the 
DC's grant of habeas relief to three convicted murderers. Petitioner 
contends the lower courts erred in applying Bruton and in holding 
that the Bruton error found was not harmless beyond a doubt in 
this ''interlocking confession" case. Additionall~, petitioner 
contends the lower courts violated 28 u.s.c. § 2254(d) by not 
affording a presumption of correctness to state court findings 
regarding alleged Miranda violations fully and fairly litigated 
in the state court criminal proceedings. 
fl~ ~ ~q_c.Jco/ ~~ ~ · 
( 
L 
FACTS: Petitioners were convicted of felony murder · committed 
in the course of a robbery of a poker game and sentenced to life 
imprisonment. The robbery was initiated by Robert Wood, who had 
been cheated in prior games by one William Douglas. According 
to the plan devised by Robert's brother Joe, petititioners were 
to break in and rob the game, and they would be given a share of 
the proceeds. Joe told petrs that he would be at the game and 
would kill Douglas if necessary. Suffice it to say that things did 
not go according to plan, and that 0oe was forced to draw on 
Douglas and a bystander Thomas, give the gun to his brother, 
and leave the room to get petrs. Before petrs and Joe returnedi 
Robert had shot and killed Douglas, who allegedly had drawn on him. 
Petrs then brok·j~ith Joe~ Robert grabbed the money, and all fled 
v' 
but Thomas. Robert was the only defendant to take the stand at 
trial. He argued self-defense and that the dirty rat deserved to die 
-------~------------~ 
anyways. Robert could clearly identify only petr Hamilton as one 
of the participants. Thomas could not identify any of the petrs 
'l V' f h .c d at tr1a . None o t e petrs took the stand, but each had coniesse 
to the robbery prior to the trial, and the confessions were admitted 
~ -----------------
over objection under instructions to consider them only against 
their individual authors. Efforts were made to redact the confessions 
....---
so as not to directly incri~inate codefendants, but the State 
has conceded previously that the redactions did not achieve their 
intended purpose. Prior to trial efforts were made to suppress 
the confessions as involuntary and taken in violation of Miranda, 
but the motions were denied by the state court after a full hearing. 
The Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed petrs' convictions 
on the basis of ~uton violations and on the ground that petrs 
could not be convicted of felony murder because the murder had 
occurred prior to the robbery. The Tennessee Sup~eme Court reversed 
( and reinstated the convictions. The felony murder convictions stood 
because the murder was part of the res gestae of the robbery that 
petrs had agreed to participate in. And, Bruton was inapposite 
confession ·had rendered the preiudicial 
1 
because each petitioner's 
impact of their codefendants' confessions de minimis and harmless 
error in any event. Petitioners then sought federal habeas. 
HOLDINGS BELOW: The district court granted relief on the basis 
of the Bruton violations that the court could not regard as 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court also 
found that relief was independently warranted as to petr Pickens 
because his confession was taken after the police had denied his 
request for counsel. The court found that the presumption of 
correctness given the state trial court's contrary finding 
of fact on this issue, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), could not sta~d 
because the finding was unsupported by the record. Pickens testified 
that he had repeatedly asked for counsel to be present during 
questioning. The interrogating officers testified to the contrary. 
The DC found it "inconceivable" that Pickens would not have asked 
for counsel because he had talked to co~nsel only hours before his 
arrest and was advised to request counsel if he was arrested be f ore 
counsel could meet with him and arrange his surrender. 
~he court of appeals affirmed on both grounds but discussed 
only the Bruton ground at length; Acknowledging that there was 
a clear conflict in the Circuits as to whether Bruton applied at all -------------------- - ~--- .-.-~--- context 
in the interlocking-confession/and as to whether~ if it did, the 
'J!::. ' ' 
interlocking confessions rendered any Bruton error virtually 
p~s·,' the court followed its own rule that Bruton 
( 
c 
applied, and further held that the error was not harmless beyond 
' 
a reasonable doubt in the circumstances of this case. The court 
found nothing in Schneble v. Florida, 405 u.s. 427 (1972), or 
Harrington v. California, 395 u.s. 250 (1969) 1 that rendered 
Bruton inapposite in the interlocking-confession context. 
They were, however, relevant to the harmless error question in 
that they demonstrate that the defendant's own confession was 
to be taken into account in determining the harmless error issue. 
Accordingly, in determining the harmless error issue, the court 
"accept[ed] at face value each of the defenctants' confessions 
••• as it might apply in a single trial against him." But, 
even when the confessions were taken into account along with 
the other evidence admitted against petrs, the total evidence 
against each petr, though sufficient to support a guilty verdict, 
was not "so overwhelming as to compel the jury verdict of guilty. 11 
The court concluded that it was not clear "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" that the outcome would have been the same if each petr 
was confronted with only his own r' and not his codefendants,, { 
~onfession because (1) petrs were not involved in the gambling; 
(2) they did not originate the robbery plah? (3) they were not present 
when the deceased was killed; (4) the jury could have found the 
plan terminated when the mastermind pulled a gun. Moreover, had 
two of the three confessions been removed from the jury's consciousness 
by adherence to Bruton, the jury might well have .. determined that 
each petr's confession was involuntary 
( 
( 
CONTENTIONS: Petitioner argues that Bruton is inapposite in 
' 
an interlocking-confession case because the risk of incurable 
prejudice arising from the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's 
confession is negligible when the defendant himself haS confessed. 
Bruton is distinguishable because it involved the admission of 
a codefendant's confession against a nonconfessing defendant, 
rather than interlocking confessions that each corroborated the 
other as here. In support of this argument, petr justifiably relies 
on Catanzaro v. Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1968), Mack v. 
Maggio, 538 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1976), and numerous other cases 
that explicitly or implicitly adopt the same reasoning. 
' , ' \' '- ' , , 
Alternatively, petr contends that c even if .Bruton applies 
and renders each codefendant's confession inadmissible against 
each defendant, the fact of the defendant's confession itself 
renders any Bruton error so de minimis as to be almost per se 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In support of this argument .• 
petr relies on United State~ v. Spinks, 470 F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 
1972), and other cases that have resulted in virtually automatic 
application of the harmless error doctrine in the interlocking-
confession context. Naturally, Harrington and Schneble are relied 
on in support of this harmless error doctrine, 
Finally, petr urges error in the overturning of the state court's 
finding that Pickens had not been denied his Miranda rights. 
only 
This finding, though/implicit in the state trial court's denial 
of Pickens's motion to suppress his confession/ was entitled to 
a presumption of correctness in the federal habeas proceeding. 




695 (1973}, petr argues that the DC erred in substituting its 
credibility determinations ann judgment for that of the state 
trial court on the Miranda issue. 
ANALYSIS: As the court of appeals admitted in its opinion, 
and as even a cursory examinati.on of the cases cited in its 
opinion will confirm, there is a f clear conflici)among the 
Circuits regarding the applicability of Bruton and the harmless 
error doctrine in "interlocking confession" or "parallel statement'' 
cases, such as this one. Some courts take the position that 
Bruton applie~ and the harmless error question must be ascertained 
on a case-by-case basis. (6th Cir.} Others say Bruton simply 
~.,...._..., 
does not apply in that context. (2nd Cir.) Still others say 
no Bruton error could be regarded as prejudicial and is almost 
per se harmless in thl.s context. (7th} And, many courts affirm 
convictions in this context without finding any need to concern 
themselves "with the legal nicety as to whether the case is 
without the Bruton rule, or is within the Bruton rule and the 
violation thereof constituting harmless error.'' Metropolis v. 
Turner, 437 F.2d 207 (lOth Cir. 1971}. Then, of course, there 
are the conflicts between the CircuitS: and the state courts 
within the respective Circuits, as here, between the Sixth 
Circuit and the Tennessee Supreme Court. The issues involved 
cry out for Supreme Court review, whatever one's views on the merits. 
Moreover, if petr's representation that the records before 
the state and federal courts on Pickens's Miranda claim were 
virtually indistinguishable is correct, there would appear to 
----------------~--------------- \ ' be a serious 28 u.s.c. 2254(d) problem in this case. Arguably, 
at least, the district c urt simply substituted its judgment 
for that of the state trial court on this factual issue after 
holding a Townsend hearing. The presumption of correctness normally 
accorded state court findings fell in this instance because the 
district court determined that the state court finding simply 
was not supported by the state court record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (8) 
does, of course, authorize federal district court review of the 
sufficiency of the evidence in the state court record to support 
a state court finding but does not specify the standard of 
review which the district court is to apply to the evidence 
and state court record. Clearly, here, the district court drew 
independent inferences from the state court record and appeared 
to make de novo determinations of credibility. This may be 
proper, but other courts at least have applied a "substantial -------- -------------------------evidence," Piche v. Rhay, 4/.2 F.2d 1309~ 1311 (9th Cir. 1970), 
or "clearly erroneous," United States ex rel. Bornholdt v. 
Ternullo, 402 F. Supp. 374, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), standard of 
review in these circumstances. Neither Townsend v. Sain, 372 
U.S. 293, 316 (1963), nor any subsequent decision of this Court 
of which I am aware clearly spells out the appropriate standard 
of review for determining whether a state court finding is 
"fairly supported" by the state court record within the meaning 
of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (8). This case~· thus, may well present 
an appropriate opportunity to define and apply the applicable 
standard of review. 
I '.__, There is no response. 
9/1/78 l.Valsh opins in petn 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Eric 
DATE: October 14, 1978 
RE: Parker v. Randolph, et al. 
October 27, 1978 Conference 
I tJ-') B - 7-2 -
~.J2s~o( ~1-r. 
lr/?V~' I~ ~ ~ ...6~ 
r-ecUve.A -~ ~ ~ 
£..q. 
The requested response has now been received. In a 
somewhat rambling brief, two of the respondents, Randolph and 
Pickens (Hamilton, the third resp, has apparently not responde~, 
offer the following reasons for denying cert in this case. 
First, it is contended that the decision on the Bruton 
issue is clearly correct on the merits. Resps argue that Bruton 
should apply in interlocking confession cases as much as in any 
other context, and they dispute that the evidence against them was 
so strong that the harmless error doctrine can do the state any 
good. They also claim that the confessions were not truly 
interlocking to the extent that this would be a good case for the 
Court to straighten out the conflict among the circuits on the 
Bruton question. 
With respect to the standard of review of the state trial 
court's factual findings by the federaJ habeas court, resps argue 
that the federal court could not· really give any presumptive weight 
to the ruling if the state court since there was no statement of 
findings and conclusions, just an order stating the result. Resps 
point out that in the habeas proceeding the state presented no 
witnesses in its own behalf on the factual question (whether 
Pickens had asked for counsel before his confession), but chose to 
rely solely on the transcript of the hearing in state court. 
Pickens, on the other hand, presented strong evidence, and the 
federal district judge found the state's position to be 
1 "practically inconceivable." 
Whether the court of appeals was correct on the merits of 
the Bruton issue is not critical to the decision to grant cert 
because the existence of a circuit conflict on this important issue 
is sufficient to justify review by this Court. It is more 
c.___. - --------, 
-~ im~~nt whether the confessions were truly interlocking. If they 
were not, then this might not be a very suitable vehicle in which 
to decide the applicability of Bruton to cases falling within the 
2. 
3. 
interlocking confession pattern. It is possible -- likely, in fact -
- that resps are understating the degree to which the confessions 
corroborate each other, for they don't quote from the statements 
themselves, and the opinions of the courts below don't address this 
issue. But if resps are correct, the Court might want to think 
hard before granting. If it looks like the conference is 
I 
interested in taking the issue, perhaps the case should be relisted 
and the record called for to determine whether this is a suitable 
case. The legal oficers might be asked to check into this. 
..... .._.......-..-- - - ---
A similar problem exists with respect to the standard-of-
review question. If indeed the state trial court failed to state 
its findings of fact and conclusions of law, this might not be an 
ideal occasion to get into the amount of deference that a federal 
habeas court must show to state trial court's factual findings. 
The lower court's order doesn't seem to be among the papers at the 
Court, so perhaps calling for the record would be helpful in this 
respect as well. 
These are important issues deserving of review, but I 
think the Court should be careful not to jump into a case that 





Mr. Justice Powell ~ 
Eric ~~V>~~-~ 
--~ 
November 10, 1978  r1u- bs  
. ~~~~~~ 
Parker v. Hamilton, No. 78-99 _ ~ J A ·- n 
/)-L '14~ ,. 
t2, --'btl·~~ ~  
The record in this case has been received. I 
____ __.,) 
recommended that you call for it to determine whether the 
confessions of the three co-defendants were truly "interlocking" 
to the extent necessary to present squarely the Bruton issue 
raised in the petition for cert. The record was also requested 
in order to to determine whether the state trial court entered 
any findings of fact. If he did not, this would not be a good 
2. 
' 
case in which to decide what deference a federal habeas court 
must afford factual findings by a state criminal court. 
The record is voluminous, not well- indexed, and in a 
bad physical state. After about an hour I was able to locate two 
of the confessions. I am sure the other material is in there, 
but it will take some time to dig it out and make the necessary 
analysis. If you think it is appropriate, it would be a big help 
to me to have the legal officers take on this project. Although 
it is a troublesome task, it beats trying to write an opinion in 
a case that never should have been granted. 
With your approval, perhaps this assignment could be 
refered · to the legal officers with the following instructions: 
1. Locate and copy the statements of the respondents, 
as they were put in evidence at their state-court trial, 
that form the basis of the alleged Bruton violation. 
2. Determine whether the confessions are "interlocking" 
with respect to the relevant facts in such as way as to 
present squarely the Bruton issue raised in the cert 
petition. 
3. Locate and copy all the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law made by the state-court trial judge. 
Incidentally, another cert petn raising the ~t9~ 
issue, perhaps on a better record, has been received and is 
scheduled to be considered at the November 22 conference. 
Tamilio v. New York, No. 78-5504. I authored the preliminary 
memorandum which has been annotated and put in your box. 
3. 
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Ae ) o1A 
Motion for Appointment of 
Counsel 
Resps ask that Walter Lee Evans, Esq., be appointed to 
represent them. Mr. Evans was admitted to the bar of Tenn. in 
1968. He was appointed to represent resps in their s uccess ful habeas 
petn, and to defend that decision in CA 6. 
Mr. Evans appears qualified, but he does not say whether he 
is a member of the bar of_this Court. If not, he should be 
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..JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
, .. 
April 23, 1979 
Re: No. 78-99, Parker v. Randolph 
Dear Bi 11 , 
I am glad to join your opinion for 
the Court. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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1st DRAFT 
lo: The Chief Justloe 
lr. Justice Brennan 
1r. Justice Stewart 
.,. Justice White 
~. Justice Marshall 
llr. Justice Blackllun 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
lroa: Mr. Justice Rehnqutat 
Ciroulated: 2 3 APR 1979 
Beoiroulated: __________ __ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 78-99 
Harry Parker, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to the United 
v. States Court of Appeals for the 
James Randolph et al. Sixth Circuit. 
[April -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), this Court 
reversed the robbery conviction of a defendant who had been 
implicated in the crime by his codefendant's extrajudicial con-
fession. Because the codefendant had not taken the stand 
at the joint trial and thus could not be cross-examined, the 
Court held that admission of the codefendant's confession had 
deprived the defendant of his rights under the Confrontation 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The issue before us in this 
case is whether Bruton requires reversal of a defendant's con-
viction when the defendant himself has confessed and his con-
fession "interlocks" with and supports the confession of his 
codefendant. We hold that it does not. 
I 
Respondents were convicted of murder committed during 
the commission of a robbery and were sentenced to life im-
prisonment. The cast of characters playing out the scenes 
that led up to the fatal shooting could have come from 
the pen of Bret Harte.1 The story began in June 1970, when 
1 As the Court of Appeals aptly commented, "This appeal involved a 
sequence of events which have the flavor of the old West before the law 
ever crossed the Pecos. The difference is that here there are no heroes and 
here· there was a trial." 575 F. 2d 1178, 1179 (CA6 1978). 
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one William Douglas, a professional gambler from Las Vegas, 
Nev., arrived in Memphis, Tenn., calling himself Ray Blay-
lock and carrying a. gun and a deck of cards. It ended on the 
evening of July 6, 1970, when Douglas was shot and killed in 
a Memphis apartment. 
Testimony at the trial in the Tennessee state court showed 
that one Woppy Gaddy, who was promised a cut of Douglas' 
take, arranged a game of chance between Douglas and 
Robert Wood, a sometime Memphis gambler. Unwilling to 
trust the outcome of the contest entirely to luck or skill, 
Douglas marked the cards, and by game's end Robert Wood 
and his money had been separated. A second encounter 
between the two men yielded similar results, and Wood grew 
suspicious of Douglas' good fortune. In order to determine 
whether and how Douglas was cheating, Wood brought to the 
third game an acquaintance named Tommy Thomas, who had 
a reputation of being a "pretty good poker player." Unknown 
to Wood, however, Thomas' father and Douglas had been close 
friends; Thomas, predictably, threw in his lot with Douglas, 
purposefully lost some $1,000, and reported to Wood that the 
game was clean. Wood nonetheless left the third game con-
vinced that he was being cheated and intent on recouping his 
now considerable losses. He explained the situation to his 
brother, Joe E. Wood, and the two men decided to relieve 
Douglas of his ill-gotten gains by staging a robbery of the 
upcoming fourth game. 
At this juncture respondents Randolph, Pickens, and Hamil-
ton entered the picture. · To carry out the staged robbery, Joe 
Wood enlisted respondent Hamilton, who was one of his 
employees, and the latter in turn associated respondents Ran-
dolph and Pickens. Douglas and Robert Wood sat down to 
the fourth and final contest on the evening of July 6, 1970. 
Joe Wood and Thomas were present in the room as spectators. 
During the course of the game, Douglas armed himself with a 
. 38 caliber pistol and an automatic shotgun; in response to 
78-99-0PINION 
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this unexpected development Joe Wood pulled a derringer 
pistol on Douglas and Thomas, gave the guu to Robert Wood, 
and left to tell respondents to move in on the game. Before 
respondents arrived, however, Douglas reached for his pistol 
and was shot and killed by Robert Wood. Moments later, 
respondents and Joe Wood broke down the apartment door, 
Robert Wood gathered up the cash left on the table, and the 
gang of five fled into the night. Respondents were subse-
quently apprehended by the police and confessed to their 
involvement in the crime. 
Respondents and the Wood brothers were jointly tried and 
convicted of murder during the commission of a robbery. 
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2402.2 Each defendant was sentenced 
to life imprisonment. Robert Wood took the stand at trial, 
admitting that he had killed Douglas, but claiming that the 
shooting was in self-defense. Thomas described Douglas' 
method of cheating at cards and admitted his complicity in the 
fraud on Robert Wood. He also testified in substance that 
he was present in the room when Joe Wood produced the 
derringer and when Robert Wood shot and killed Douglas. 
None of the respondents took the stand. Thomas could 
not positively identify any of them, and although Robert 
Wood named Hamilton as one of the three men involved in 
the staged robbery, he did not clearly identify Randolph and 
Pickens as the other two. The State's case against respond-
ents thus rested primarily on their oral confessions, found by 
2 Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-2402 provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
"39-2402, Mu1'de1' in the Fi1'st Deg1'ee-An individual commits murder in 
the first degree if ... 
" ( 4) he commits a willful, deliberate and malicious killing or murder dur-
ing the perpetration of an~· arson, rape, robbery, burglarly, larceny, kidnap-
ping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of .a 
qestructive device or bomb.'' 
78-99-0PINION 
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the trial court to have been freely and voluntarily given, which 
were admitted into evidence through the testimony of several 
officers of the Memphis Police Department.3 A written con-
fession signed by Pickens was also admitted into evidence over 
his objection that it had been obtained in violation of his 
rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The 
trial court instructed the jury that each confession could be 
used only against the defendant who gave it and could not be 
considered as evidence of a codefendant's guilt. 
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals reversed respond-
ents' convictions, holding that they could not be guilty of 
felony murder since Douglas had been shot before they arrived 
on the scene and. alternatively, that admission of their con-
fessions at the joint trial violated this Court's decision in 
Bruton. The Tennessee Supreme Court in turn reversed the 
Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstated the convictions. 
Because "each and every defendant either through words. or 
actions demonstrated his knowledge that 'killing may be nec-
essary,' " App. 237, the court held that respondents' agree-
ment to participate in the robbery rendered them liable under 
the Tennessee felony-murder statute for Douglas' death. The 
Tennessee Supreme Court also disagreed with the Court of 
Criminal Appeals that Bruton had been violated, emphasiz-
ing that the confession at issue in Bruton had inculpated a 
nonconfessing defendant in a joint trial at which neither 
defendant took the stand. Here, in contrast, the "interlocking 
inculpatory confessions" of respondents Randolph, Pickens, 
and Hamilton. "clearly demonstrated the involvement of each, 
as to crucial facts such as time, location, felonious activity, and 
3 Each of the confessions were subjected to a process of redaction in 
which references by the confessing defendant to other defendants were 
replaced with the words "blank" or "another per~on." As the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit observed below, the confrssions were never-
theless "such as to !rave no possible doubt in the jurors' minds concrrning 
the 'person[s]' referred to." 575 F. 2d, at 1180 (CA6 1978). 
' . 
78-99-0PINION 
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awareness of the overall plan or scheme." App. 245. Accord-
ingly, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded: "The fact that 
jointly tried codefendants have confessed precludes a violation 
of the Bruton rule where the confessions are similar in mate-
rial aspects." App. 245, quoting Tennessee v. Elliott, 524 
S. W. 2d 473, 478 (Tenn. 1975). 
The United States District Court for the Western District 
of Tennessee thereafter granted respondents' applications for 
writs of habeas corpus, ruling that their rights under Bruton 
had been violated and that introduction of respondent Pickens' 
uncounseled written confession had violated his rights under 
Miranda v. Arizona, supra. The Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit affirmed. holding that admission of the confes-
sions violated the rule announced in Bruton and that the error 
was not harmless since the evidence against each respondent, 
even considering his confession, was "not so overwhelming as 
to compel the jury verdict of guilty ... " 575 F. 2d, at 1182. 
The Court of Appeals frankly acknowledged that its decision 
conflicts with decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit holding the Bruton rule inapplicable " [ w] here the 
jury has heard not only a co-defendant's confession but the 
defendant's own [interlocking] confession." United States ex 
rel. Catanzaro v. Mancusi, 404 F. 2d 296, 300 (CA2 1968), cert. 
denied, 397 U. S. 942 (1970). Accord, United States ex rel. 
Stanbridge v. Zelker, 514 F. 2d 45, 48-50 (CA2), cert. denied, 
423 U. S. 872 (1975); United States ex rel. Duff v. Zelker, 452 
F. 2d 1009, 1010 (CA2 1971), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 932 
(1972). We granted certiorari in this case to resolve that con-
fiict.4 439 U.S. 978 (1978). 
4 The conflict extends throughout the Courts of Appeals. The Courts 
of Appeals for the Third and Sixth Circuit:; have expre:;,;ly ruled that the 
Bruton rule applieH in the context of interlocking confrs:;ions, see Hodges v. 
Rose, 470 F. 2d 643 (CA6 1978); United States v. DiGilio, 538 F. 2d 972, 
981-983 (CA3 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977), and the Court 
of A11peals for the Ninth Circuit has done :;o impliedly, ser I gnaco v. Guarn, 
413 F. 2d 513, 515-516 (CA9 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943 (1970). In 
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II 
In Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U. S. 232 (1957), a 
nontestifying codefendant's confession, which incriminated a 
defendant who had not confessed, was admitted at a joint trial 
over defendant's hearsay objection. Concluding that "it was 
reasonably possible for the jury to follow" the trial court's 
instruction to consider the confession only against the de-
clarant, this Court held that admission of the confession did 
not constitute reversible error. Little more than a decade 
later, however, Delli Paoli was expressly overruled in Bruton 
v. United States, supra. In that case defendants Bruton and 
Evans were ponvicted of armed postal robbery after a joint trial. 
Although Evans did not take the stand, a postal inspector was 
allowed to testify that Evans had orally confessed to having 
committed the robbery with Bruton. The trial judge in-
structed the jury that Evans' confession was competent evi-
dence against Evans, but was inadmissible hearsay against 
Bruton and therefore could not be considered in determining 
Bruton's guilt. 
addition to tf Court of AppE>als for the Second Circuit, at least four 
other Courts f Appeals have rejected the Bruton claims of confessing 
defendants. ases from the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have reasoned that 
the Bruton m e does not apply in the context of interlocking confessions 
and that, even if it does, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
See Mack v. ¥aggio, 538 F. 2d 1129, 1130 (CA5 1976); United States v. 
Spinks, 470 F. 2d 64, 65-66 (CA7), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1011 (1972). 
Two other Co~rts of Appeals have rejected the Bruton claims of confessing 
defendants, re(usin~ to concern themselves "with the legal nicety as to 
whether the ... case is without the Bruton rule, or is within Bruton and 
the violation hereof constitute[s] only harmless error." Metropolis v. 
Turner, 437 ll 2d 207, 208-209 (CA10 1971); accord, United States v. 
Walton, 538 F. 2d 1348, 1353-1354 (CAS), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1025 
(1975). State court decisions in this area are in similar disarray. Com-
pare, e. g .. Stfwart v. Arkansas, 519 S. W. 2d 733 (1975), and People v. 
Moll, 26 N.Y. 2d 1, 256 N. E. 2d 175, cert. denied, sub nom. Stanbridgr v. 
New York, 398 U.S. 911 (1970), with People v. Rosochacki, 41 Ill. 2d 483, 
244 N. E. 2d 136 (Ill. 1969), and Connecticut v. Oliver, 160 Conn. 85, 273 
A. 2d 867 (1970) . 
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This Court reversed Bruton's conviction, noting that despite 
the trial court's admittedly clear limiting instruction, "the 
introduction of Evans' confession added substantial, perhaps 
even critical, weight to the Government's case in a form not 
subject to cross-examination." Bruton v. United States, 
supra, 391 U. S., at 127-128. Bruton was therefore held to 
have been denied his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. 
The Bruton court reasoned that although in many cases the 
jury can and will follow the trial judge's instruction to disre-
gard inadmissible evidence, 
"there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury 
will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the 
consequences of failure so vital to the defendant. that 
the practical and human limitations of the jury system 
cannot be ignored. . . . Such a context is presented here, 
where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial state-
ments of a co-defendant who stands accused side-by-side 
with the defendant, arc deliberately spread before the 
jury in a joint trial. Not only are the incrimi11ations 
devastating to the defendant, but their credibility is 
inevitably suspect, a fact recognized when accomplices do 
take the stand and the jury is instructed to weigh their 
testimony carefully given the recognized motivation to 
shift blame onto others. The unreliability of such evi-
dence is intolerably compounded when the alleged accom-
plice, as here. does not testify and cannot be tested by 
cross-examination. It was against such threats to a fair 
trial that the Confrontation Clause was directed." I d., 
at 135-136 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
One year after Bruton was decided, this Court rejected the 
notion that erroneous admission at a joint trial of evidence 
such as that introduced in Bruton automatically requires 
reversal of an otherwise valid conviction. See Harrington v. 
California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969). In some cases the properly 
admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming, and the prej-
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udicial effect of the codefendant's admission so insignificant 
by comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that 
introduction of the admission at trial was harmless error.5 
Petitioner urges us to follow the reasoning of the Court of 
5 In Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969), four defendants 
were found guilty of murder after a joint trial. Defendant Harrington 
admitted being at the scene of the crime but denied complicity. His three 
codefendants, however, confessed, and their confession;; were introduced at 
trial with the instruction that the jury was to consider each confe~::sion only 
against its source. One of Harrington's codefendants, whose confession 
implicated Harrington, took the stand and was subject to cross-examina-
tion. The other two codefendants, whose statements corroborated Harring-
ton's admitted presence at the scene of the crime, did not take the stand. 
Noting the overwhelming evidence of Harrington's guilt, and the relatively 
insignificant prejudicial impact of his codefendants' statements, the Court 
held that "the lack of opportunity to cro,;s-examine [the non-testifying 
trine to claimed violations of Bruton. In Schneble v. Florida, 405 U. S. 
Calijor1tia, 386 U. S. 18 (1967) l" 395 U. S., at 253. 
On two subsequent occa~ion,;, this Court has applied the harmle,;s error 
doctrine to claimed violations of Bruton. In Schneble "· Florida, 405 U. S. 
427 ( 1972), Schneble and a codefendant were found guilty of murder 
following a joint trial. Althoug11 neither defendant took the stand, police 
officers were allowed to testify as to a detailed confession given by Schneble 
and a statement given by his codefendant wl1icl1 tended to corroborate 
certain portions of Schneble';; confession. We assumed, without deciding 
that admission of the codefendant's statement had violated Bruton, but 
held that in view of the overwhelming evidence of Schneble';; guilt and the 
comparatively insignificant impact of the codefendant',; statement, "any 
violation of Br·uton that may have occurred at petitioner's trial was harm-
less error beyond a reasonable doubt." 405 U.S., at 428 (emphasis added). 
In Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973), the prosecution intro-
duced police testimony regarding extrajudicial statementR made by two 
nontestifying codefendants. Each statement implicated both of the co-
defendants in the crimes charged. Neither codefendant took the stand, 
and the police testimony was admitted into evidence at their joint trial. 
Although the Solicitor General conceded that the statements were admitted 
into evidence in violation of Bruton, this Court held that the police tes-
timony "was merely cumulative of o1 her overwhelming and largely uncon-
troverted evidence properly before the jury." /d., at 231. Thus, .any 
Bruton error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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Appeals for the Second Circuit and to hold that the Bruton 
rule does not apply in the context of interlocking confessions. 
Alternatively, he contends that if introduction of interlocking 
confessions at a joint trial does violate Bruton, the error is 
all but automatically to be deeme.d harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt. We agree with petitioner that admission at the 
joint trial of respondents' interlocking confessions did not 
infringe respondents' right of confrontation secured by the 
·Sixth and Fourteenth Amendme1its to the United States Con-
stitution. but prefer to cast the issue in a slightly broader 
form than that posed by petitioner. 
Bruton recognized that admission at a joint trial of the 
incriminating extrajudicial statements of a nontestifying 
codefendant can have "devastating" consequences to a non .. 
confessing defendant, adding "substantial, perhaps even criti-
cal weight to the Government's case:" 391 U. S., at 128. 
Such statements go to the jury untested by cross-examination 
and , indeed, perhaps unanswered altogether unless the defend-
ant waives his Fifth Amendment privilege and takes the stand. 
The prejudicial impact of a codefendant's confession upon an 
incriminated defendant who has, insofar as the jury is con-
cerned, mainta.ined his innocence from the beginning is simply 
too great in such cases to be cured by a limiting instruction. 
The same cannot be said, however, when the defendant's own 
confession-"probably the most probative and damaging evi-
dence that can be admitted against him," Bruton v. United 
States, supra, at 139 (WHITE, J .. dissenting) - is properly 
introduced at trial. The defendant is "the most knowledge-
able and unimpeachable source of information about his past 
conduct." id. , at 140 (WHITE, J., dissenting), and one can 
scarcely imagine evidence more damaging to his defense than 
his own admission of guilt. Thus, the incriminating state-
ments of a codefendant will seldom, if ever, be of the "devas-
tating" character referred to in Bruton when the incriminated 
defendant has admitted his own guilt. The right protected 
i. ~ 
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by Bruton-the "constitutional right of cross-examination," 
id., at 137-has far less practical value to a defendant who 
has confessed to the crime than to o11e who has consistently 
maintained his innocence. Successfully impeaching a code-
fendant's confession on cross-examination would likely yield 
small advantage to the defendant whose own admission of 
guilt stands before the jury unchallenged. Xor does the nat-
ural "motivation to shift blame onto others," recognized by 
the Bruton Court to render the incriminating statements of 
codefendants "inevitably suspect." id., at 136, require applica-
tion of the Bruton rule when the incriminated defendant has 
corroborated his codefendant's statements by heaping blame 
onto himself. 
The right of confrontation conferred by the Sixth Amend-
ment is a safeguard to ensure the fairness and accuracy of 
criminal trials, see Dutton Y. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 89 (1970), 
and its reach cannot be divorced from the system of trial by 
jury contemplated by the Constitution. A crucial assumption 
underlying that system is that juries will follow the instruc-
tions given them by the trial judge. Were this not so, it 
would be pointless for a trial court to instruct a jury, and even 
more pointless for an appellate court to reverse a criminal con-
victiOJ1 because the jury was improperly instructed. The Con-' 
frontation Cla.use has never been held to bar the admission 
into evidence of every relevant extrajudicial statement made 
by a nontestifying declarant simply because it in some way 
incriminates the defendant. See, e. g., id., at 80; Mattox v. 
United States, 156 U. R. 237,240-244 (1895). And an instruc-
tion directing the jury to consider a codefendant's extrajudicial 
statement only against its source has been found sufficient to 
avoid offending the confrontation right of the implicated de-
fendant in numerous decisions of this Court.6 
8 In Opper v. ['uited States, :1-l-8 U. S. 84 (1954), prtitionrr contendrcl 
that the trial court had rrred in ovrrrnling his motion for RevrranrP, argu-
ing that the jury may have improperly con~idcrcd statemrn(:.; of hi;; co. 
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When, as in Bruton, the defendant has chosen not to take 
the stand and has made no extrajudicial admission of guilt, 
limiting instructions cannot be accepted as adequate to safe-
guard the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause. 
Under such circumstances, the "practical and human limita-
tions of the jury system," Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S., 
at 135, override the theoretically sound premise that a jury 
will follow the trial court's instructions. But when the de-
fendant's own confession is properly before the jury, we be-
lieve that the constitutional scaies tip the other way. The 
possible prejudice resulting from the failure of the jury to fol-
low the trial court's instructions !s not so "devastating" or 
"vital" to the confessing defendant to require departure from 
the general rule allowing admission of evidence with limiting 
instructions. We therefore hold that admission of interlock-
ing confessions with proper limiting instructions conforms to 
the requirements of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to "the United States Constitution. Accordingly, the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals as to respondents Hamilton and 
Randolph is reversed. 
defendant, which were inadmbsihle as to petitioner, in finding petitioner 
guilty. Thi;; Court rejrcted the contention: 
"It i;; within the sound diHcretion of the trial judge as to whether the 
defendants should be tried together or several!~· and there i~ nothing in the 
record to indicate an abuse of such discretion when petitionrr's motion for 
scvrrance was ovPrruled. The trial judge here made clear and repentrd 
ndmonitions to thr jury at appropriate times that Hollifield's incriminatory 
statrments wrrr not to br considered in e:stabli~hing the guilt of the 
petitioner. To say that the jury might have been confu::;ed amounts to 
nothing more than an unfounded SJ)eculation that thr jurors dil:iregardrd 
clear inHtruction:-; of the court in arriving at their verdict. Our theor~· of 
trial rrlir:-; upon 1 he abilitr of a jury to follow instructions. There is 
nothing in thi;; rrcord to call for rever~al because of any C'onfu::;ion or 
inju~tirf' ari::;ing from thr joint trial. Thr record contain::; substantial com-
prtent evidence upon which the jury could find petiti01wr guilty." !d., at 
95; sec, e. g. , Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U. S. 539, 552-553 (1947). 
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III 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's granting 
of habeas corpus relief to respondent Pickens on the additional 
ground that his rights under Miranda, v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 
436 (1966) , had been violated. Although petitioner sought 
review of this ruling. our grant of certiorari was limited to the 
Bruton issue. We thus have no occasion to pass on the merits 
of the Court of Appeals Miranda ruling. Accordingly, the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals as to respondent Pickens is 
affirmed. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
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